Postdoctoral researcher in economics in coastal risk areas

This project focuses on the effects of climate change in coastal areas and aims to promote the development of adaptation strategies.

Post-doctorate, 15 months, University of Bordeaux, Bordeaux School of Economics (BxSE), and ETTIS-INRAE.

SUMMARY OF THE MISSION

Analyze incentive mechanisms that would encourage individual protective behaviors (such as residential mobility) in line with the presence of increasing risks on the coast. To do this,

• Assess homeowners' risk preferences and their understanding of the protective measures (insurance and other) offered against risk, as well as their willingness to relocate.
• Model the contracts most likely to encourage residents of risk-prone areas to adopt risk protection measures, particularly relocation.

Approaches: Microeconomics. Contract and incentive theory, Risk and uncertainty theory, Preference evaluation (possibly via discrete choice or other experimental methods).

MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF THE POST-DOCTORATE

The University of Bordeaux is a dynamic, inclusive and responsible university that cares about the well-being of its staff. Bordeaux School of Economics is a joint research unit of the University of Bordeaux, CNRS and INRAE. This laboratory constitutes one of the main French research centers in economics and aims to contribute significantly to major contemporary societal issues. BxSE aims to increase its visibility vis-à-vis the societal sphere, to strengthen its attractiveness for external researchers and PhD students and to generate a high-level interdisciplinary research dynamic.

YOUR MISSION DURING THE POST-DOCTORATE

Context: The coastline is exposed to significant and increasing risks of erosion and flooding (IPCC). However, it remains very attractive for many populations, with upward pressure on land and real estate markets, and growing social and environmental inequalities. The increasing vulnerability of these territories requires the implementation of risk adaptation strategies at the territorial level.

The evolution of the climate is accompanied by an increase in claims and questions the evolution of the existing insurance system. Inducing the adoption of individual protective behaviours is therefore desirable. This study particularly targets incentives to change individual behaviors.

Objectives: We intend to design and test with the inhabitants of coastal areas, prototypes of incentive schemes. The possibility of a new insurance contract alone does not seem adequate, but it could be studied as part of a more complex scheme combining financial incentives via insurance with non-monetary incentives.

The problems faced by policy makers are exacerbated by i) wealth disparities and emotional attachment, which create non-linear incentives to move and to deploy prevention efforts (and make sorting difficult in terms of contract theory), ii) housing market responses that do not contribute to limiting localization in risky places and can increase and displace inequalities, and iii) complex interactions between public solidarity (Catnat), private financial insurance, individual precautionary efforts, public precautionary efforts and housing market constraints. This project will study how some original arrangements combining insurance (public and private) and other types of attributes (land) could limit the residential location in risk areas, by encouraging new residents not to settle there and current residents to move away from it.

The originality of this project lies first in the articulation of theoretical and empirical approaches, by proposing to explore preferences in a first step and to infer a theoretical tool in a second step. The originality is also in the design of original incentive schemes, multi- attribute, intended to improve the financial and/or land capacity of agents, depending on their situation, in order to allow them mobility.

1. Modeling of individual housing decisions

This task aims to obtain a better understanding of the interaction between housing markets and inequalities, depending on the type of insurance and prevention/protection efforts available.

• For the current inhabitants of coastal areas, it requires studying their propensity to relocate (and choose another dwelling) according to different incentive attributes such as insurance or equipment (reserved land);
• For potential future inhabitants, we can model the choices made by individuals, based on their wealth, when they are offered the possibility of buying a property by the sea or in second line, as well as the possibility of taking out private financial insurance. This could be done under different scenarios concerning national solidarity (Catnat).

This analysis may give rise to forecasts concerning the impact of insurance on the housing market.

2. Design of a hybrid incentive between public solidarity and private financial insurance

Such a hybrid incentive contract must allow for the modulation of coverage and premiums based on declared income, residential or seasonal use of the main or secondary residence, the date of acquisition of the property, the availability of adequate relocation, etc.

This analysis should be carried out in the framework of simplified versions of the individual decision templates developed in point 1. The regulation should help to solve sorting problems that make the standard design of insurance contracts unlikely to lead to the results wished. Equity issues, observability costs and fraud risks must be considered in the analysis. Some regulations may also not be legal under French laws.

The specific topics of study may evolve depending on the skills of the selected postdoctoral fellow and developments in research already underway. They include the following elements:

• Risk preferences [Economics of Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics]
• Moral hazard (the risk associated with implementing public collective insurance (CatNat) does not encourage people to avoid risky locations) [Incentive Theory]
• Elements specific to residential locations and the real estate/land market. [Urban Economics]

[1] Langreney, T., Le Cozannet, G. and Merad, M Adapter le système assurantiel Français face à l'évolution des risques climatiques.

You will work under the supervision of Prof. Cécile AUBERT, Professor in economics Univ. Bordeaux – BxSE and Dr. Jeanne DACHARY BERNARD Researcher in environmental economics, microeconomics and land economics INRAe – UR ETTIS.

APPLICATION DETAILS

Your Skills:

Holder of a PhD in in Economics, you have proven knowledge of theoretical modelling, incentive theory and decision theory under uncertainty, moral hazard and anti-selection as well as empirical studies, preference evaluation, choice experiments, discrete choice simulations.

• You are autonomous in organizing your work.
• Analytical mind and ability to synthesize.
• You are familiar with certain tools for conducting this type of study and are interested in training yourself on new techniques.
• You have a strong appetite for interdisciplinary work.
• You have excellent writing skills.

Do you recognize yourself? Apply