PhD Position F/M Detecting Dangerous Browser Extensions to Protect the Security and Privacy of Web Users

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Valbonne, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, France Inria Sophia Antipolis Temps plein

Context

The PhD position is funded by the French National Research Agency (ANR). It is part of Aurore Fass' ANR JCJC project "EXPELLIARMUS: Disarming Dangerous Browser Extensions to Protect the Security and Privacy of Web Users". EXPELLIARMUS, aims to develop methods to "disarm" dangerous extensions to better protect the security and privacy of Web users. More specifically, it will detect, understand, and mitigate dangerous browser extensions through an interdisciplinary approach combining computer science, human factors, and legal analysis. EXPELLIARMUS will deliver a systematic taxonomy of dangerous extension behaviors, open-source datasets and detection tools, as well as actionable recommendations for users, browser vendors, developers, and regulators. The PhD student will be part of the research team led by Dr. Nataliia Bielova (https://www-sop.inria.fr/members/Nataliia.
Bielova/index.html) at the Inria Centre at Université Côte d’Azur at the French Riviera. The PhD student will be supervised by Dr.-Ing. Aurore Fass (https://aurore54f.github.io/). Note that a PhD in France typically lasts 3 years.

Assignment

Context on Browser Extension Security Given the central role of the Web in our daily lives and its overall impact on society and economy, it is crucial that Web pages and browser extensions assure the security and privacy and of their large user base. Browser extensions have become an integral part of the modern Web ecosystem. The most popular desktop browser Chrome lists 280k browser extensions [1] (totaling almost 3 billion active users) in its official gallery, the Chrome Web Store [2]. Browser extensions enable users to enhance and customize their browsing

experience:
typically, extensions offer additional functionality to Web users, such as ad blocking (e.g., AdBlock), grammar checks (e.g., Grammarly), or password management (e.g., LastPass). To operate, browser extensions need elevated privileges compared to Web pages. Browser extensions can access sensitive user data, such as cookies or browsing history, and they can interact with arbitrary websites and other extensions [3, 4, 5]. While a compromised or malicious Web page is in itself troublesome, a malicious or vulnerable browser extension is much more powerful, as an attacker can leverage an extension's elevated privileges to cause more harm [3]. In particular, browser extensions can exfiltrate sensitive user data [6], track users online [7], or propagate unwanted software [8]. Detecting such threats at scale remains a challenge, as the extension ecosystem is particularly large, diverse, and continuously evolving.

Limitations of existing work

Abundant prior work attempted to detect some classes of dangerous extensions [9], e.g., malicious [10], vulnerable [3], or fingerprintable extensions [11]. However, related works have major limitations. Existing works analyze only hundreds of extensions [12], are outdated (e.g., 2012–2015 [8, 13, 14, 15]), have limited scalability and necessitate significant manual effort [16, 4], lack a clear characterization of what a dangerous behavior is [14]; and finally, only a small minority thereof is open source, as we have highlighted in [1 0]. Besides, existing machine learning-based detectors are opaque, they lack interpretability and explainability. It is therefore critical to design automated, large-scale, and reliable security and privacy analyses of browser extensions that have the potential to be deployed in the real world.

References

[1] chrome-stats. Chrome extension statistics. https://chrome-stats.com/chrome/stats

[2] Google. Chrome Web Store. https://chromewebstore.google.com

[3] Aurore Fass, Dolière Francis Somé, Michael Backes, and Ben Stock. DoubleX: Statically Detecting Vulnerable Data Flows in Browser Extensions at Scale. In ACM CCS, 2021. Code repository: https://github.com/Aurore54F/DoubleX

[4] Dolière Francis Somé. Empoweb: Empowering web applications with browser extensions. In IEEE S&P, 2019.

[5] Jianjia Yu, Song Li, Junmin Zhu, and Yinzhi Cao. Coco: Efficient browser extension vulnerability detection via coverage-guided, con
- current abstract interpretation. In ACM CCS, 2023.

[6] Quan Chen and Alexandros Kapravelos. Mystique: Uncovering information leakage from browser extensions. In ACM CCS, 2018.

[7] Michael Weissbacher, Enrico Mariconti, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Gianluca Stringhini, William Robertson, and Engin Kirda. Ex-ray: Detection of history-leaking browser extensions. In ACSAC, 2017.

[8] Xinyu Xing, Wei Meng, Byoungyoung Lee, Udi Weinsberg, Anmol Sheth, Roberto Perdisci, and Wenke Lee. Understanding malvertising through ad-injecting browser extensions. In TheWebConf, 2015.

[9] Sheryl Hsu, Manda Tran, and Aurore Fass. What is in the Chrome Web Store? Investigating Security-Noteworthy Browser Extensions. In ACM AsiaCCS, 2024.

[10] Ben Rosenzweig, Valentino Dalla Valle, Giovan